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I. INTRODUCTION
A T THE CLIMAX of Columbia Pictures' thriller "Air Force
One,"1 Harrison Ford, playing the role of the exceptionally
fight-savvy Medal of Honor-winner and President of the United
States of America, outwrestled a terrorist who had infiltrated
and taken control of the President's plane, one of the most se-
cure methods of transfer in the world. With the cargo door of
the plane ajar, Ford cleverly opened his opponent's parachute,
held him by the strap, coldly stared into his opponent's bewil-
dered face as he exclaimed, in the type of grizzly voice that
could only fit a war-hardened soldier, one of his most memora-
ble quotes on screen: "Get off my plane!" The terrorist's eyes
went wide, and he was sent flying off the plane, presumably
never to be heard from again.
Those four words, "Get off my plane," could and should be
used more often, not just by dramatically portrayed presidents
in films but by flight captains and crews operating international
airplanes-without fear of liability when they use these words
with (potentially) dangerous or disruptive passengers.
I AIR FORCE ONE (Columbia Pictures 1997).
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It is curious that even ten years after the tragic terrorist attacks
of 9/11, the focus of aviation security in the United States still
seems to be on measures taken before a plane takes off. Most of
these measures have been made possible through the Aviation
and Transport Security Act (ATSA),2 which paved the way to a
number of laws, procedures, and acts.3 There have been inter-
nal upgrades in airport security beginning with the creation of
the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), which in-
fused the country with roughly 65,000 new federal personnel,
increased screening procedures, such as criminal background
checks for airline employees,4 and required fortification of the
cockpit door.5 More familiar to the casual passenger, though,
are the "numbing array of new security measures"6 before one
even boards a plane: limitations on the number of carry-on bags,
hand searches of bags, the ban on water bottles, the removal of
shoes and laptops for X-ray screening, random selections for ad-
ditional pat-downs, and, as of December 2010, the introduction
of the Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) units.7 However,
all the added security at airports and passenger screening can-
not guarantee safety once a flight is in the air, since "a passenger
once on the plane can be just as dangerous as a bomb."8 After
all, the screening process is not perfect, and inevitably, some
banned items will find their way onto planes; nor can screening
keep the world's oldest weapon, a clenched fist, off of a plane or
keep every passenger from erupting in anger mid-flight. One
might argue that the added procedures even increase the possi-
bility of the latter happening.
With all of these new security measures, it seems ironic that
perhaps the greatest protection afforded to passengers during
an international flight is a treaty signed nearly fifty years ago in
2 See Aviation and Transport Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597
(2001).
Kelcie C. McCrae, Airport Measures Change 10 Years After 9/11, A&T REG.
(Sept. 11, 2011), http://wwv.ncatregister.com/theyard/on-the yard/airport-
measures-change-years-after/article_39e2dbf0-dcbc- leO-adad-0019bb3Of3la.
html.
4 Alicia B. Taylor & Sara Steedman, The Evolution of Airline Security Since 9/11,
INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION FOR PROTECTION OFFICERS (Dec. 2003), http://
ifpo.org/articlebank/evolutionof-airline.html.




7 Id.; McCrae, supra note 3.
8 Taylor & Steedman, supra note 4.
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Tokyo: The Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts
Committed on Board Aircraft (Tokyo Convention). 9 Currently
with 185 parties,' the Tokyo Convention gives captains and
their flight crews broad powers to act to preserve the safety of
the aircraft and its passengers, empowering the captain to take
preventative measures." For example, the captain may divert
and ground a plane and disembark a passenger or passengers
when he has "reasonable grounds" to believe a passenger has
committed or is about to commit an "offence[ ] against penal
law" or an act which "may or do[es] jeopardize the safety of the
aircraft or of persons or property therein or which jeopardize [s]
good order and discipline on board."' 2 What gives these broad
powers bite is that, if the captain has "reasonable grounds to
believe" there is a threat, he has immunity from any potential
criminal or civil liability.' 3 As such, the captain and crew can act
quickly and without second-guessing when the safety of the
flight is or could be at stake.'4
The critical question this raises is just what constitutes "rea-
sonable grounds" under the Tokyo Convention. Should courts
grant the captain or crew a great deal of deference, applying
something akin to an arbitrary or capricious standard by which
to judge their actions? Or should courts apply a more stringent
negligence standard? This issue was recently the subject of a
controversial Ninth Circuit decision in July 2010.15 In Eid v.
Alaska Airlines, Inc., the majority incorrectly applied an Ameri-
can negligence standard of reasonableness. 16 Given that this is-
sue "presents an important question of treaty interpretation
affecting the ability of tens of thousands of commercial airline
crews across the country to maintain safety and security onboard
international flights,"' 7 applying the proper level of deference is
9 See Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board
Aircraft, Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, 704 U.N.T.S. 219 [hereinafter Tokyo
Convention].
C' onvention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft Signed
at Tokyo on 14 September 1963, INT'L CIVIL AVIATION ORG., http://www2.icao.int/
en/leb/List%20of%20Parties/Tokyo.en.pdf (last visited Aug. 29, 2012).
11 See Tokyo Convention, supra note 9.
12 Id. arts. 1(1), 5-9.
13 Id. arts. 6-10.
'4 See id.
15 See Eid v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 621 F.3d 858, 866 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied,
131 S. Ct. 2874 (2011).
16 See id.
17 Linda L. Lane, Kimberly R. Gosling & Don G. Rushing, Recent Developments in
Air Carrier Litigation, 76J. AiR L. & Coro. 197, 198 (2011).
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critical. The purpose of this comment is to show that, contrary
to the ruling in Eid, courts ought to afford a great deal of defer-
ence to captains and their crews. Doing otherwise jeopardizes
the safety of the entire aircraft by resulting "in hesitation by the
pilot in circumstances where he should have acted, second-
guessing by courts, and the discovery of arguments which had
escaped the attention of the aircraft commander."'"
Part II of this comment provides a historical background of
the drafting of the Tokyo Convention, beginning with the events
that created the need for it and continuing through the drafting
process. Part III explains the two cases that have addressed the
issue of the level of deference to the captains and their crews
under the Tokyo Convention. Part IV analyzes those decisions
and argues that the appropriate standard to be applied is one of
great deference.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE
TOKYO CONVENTION
The Tokyo Convention began as a project intended to clarify
certain jurisdictional issues arising from criminal acts occurring
on board airplanes. However, through years of committees and
draft conventions, the primary objective ultimately became
flight safety, and with it, clarification of the rights and powers of
the commander of the aircraft and, to a lesser extent, the crew.
This change took place because of the evolving nature of air
travel and the increasing number of incidents arising on board
aircrafts.
A. CLIMATE OF AND PROBLEMS IN AIR TRAVEL IN THE 1940s
Although the first draft of the Tokyo Convention was drawn
up in 1950," discussions about the need for a convention clarify-
ing certain problems with international air travel had been
18 Eid, 621 F.3d at 886 (Otero, J., dissenting) (citing Int'l Civil Aviation Org.
[ICAO], International Conference on Air Law, Tokyo, Japan, Aug-Sept. 1963,
Minutes, at 223, ICAO Doc. 8565-LC/152-1 (1966) [hereinafter Minutes to Tokyo
Convention]).
19 Robert P. Boyle & Roy Pulsifer, The Tokyo Convention on Offenses and Certain
Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, 30J. AIR L. & CoM. 305, 306-07 (1964). It is
important to note, as this source will be cited heavily in the forthcoming sections,
that the authors of this article were the chief of the U.S. delegation to the Tokyo
International Conference on Air Law and a former staff adviser to a presidential
steering committee on U.S. international air transport policy. As such, they offer
not only a first-hand account of the drafting process but also, more importantly,
an understanding of the drafters and signatories at the original convention as to
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evolving since as early as 1902.20 However, it was only with a
general shift in the climate of air travel, coupled with some spe-
cific events in the 1940s and onward, that this discussion
reached the point of a pressing need. It seems no coincidence
that the work on the Tokyo Convention began as the airline in-
dustry was entering the "[e]ra of [c]ommercial Uj]ets. ' '21  Be-
tween 1935 and 1941, which saw the introduction of a new type
of airplane, the number of passengers flying in the United States
increased fivefold.22 This trend only increased as faster and
more efficient engines were introduced in the late 1940s and
early 1950s. 3 However, with such an increase, two problems
emerged: (1) as airlines were able to offer longer journeys, they
started offering passengers amenities such as alcohol to offset
some of the discomfort of air travel, which increased the likeli-
hood of fights breaking out mid-flight and (2) the added vol-
ume of passengers and flights increased opportunities for
crimes such as smuggling. 24
The most pressing issue related to these problems was under
whose jurisdiction an offender would fall if he committed a
crime during an international flight.25 This problem is clearly
demonstrated by the following hypothetical: "Suppose, for ex-
what the language "reasonable grounds to believe" was intended to mean. Id. at
305.
20 See Allan I. Mendelsohn, In-Flight Crime: The International and Domestic Picture
Under the Tokyo Convention, 53 VA. L. REV. 509, 513 (1967) (citing RgimeJuridique
des Agrostats; Rapport et Projet de M. Paul Fauchille, 19 ANN. L'INsT. DROIT INT'L 19,
51-54 (1902) ("French jurist recommend[ing] that the law of the flag... should
govern acts committed on board an aircraft")); see also Gerald F. Fitzgerald, The
Development of International Rules Concerning Offenses and Certain Other Acts on Board
Aircraft, 1 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 230, 231 n.4 (1963).
2! Asif Siddiqi, The Era of Commercial Jets, U.S. CENTENNIAL OF FLIGHT COMMIS-
SION, http://www.centennialofflight.gov/essay/CommercialAviation/JetEra/
Tran7.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2012) [hereinafter The Era of Commercial Jets]; see
also Asif Siddiqi, The Opening of the Commercial Jet Era, U.S. CENTENNIAL OF FLIGHT
COMMISSION, http://www.centennialofflight.gov/essay/CommercialAviation/
Opening-ofjet-era/Tran6.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2012) [hereinafter The
Opening of the Commercial Jet Era]; SAMI SHUBBER, JURISDICTION OVER CRIMES ON
BOARD AIRCRAFT 13 (1973) (noting the dramatic change in the development of
civil aviation before and after 1950).
22 Judy Rumerman, Commercial Flight in the 1930s, U.S. CENTENNIAL OF FLIGHT
COMMISSION, http://www.centennialofflight.gov/essay/CommercialAviation/
passenger.xperience/Tran2.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2012).
23 See The Opening of the Commercial Jet Era, supra note 21 (noting the British
Overseas Aircraft Corporation's introduction of the Comet 1 as the first commer-
cial jet airliner to be introduced into service).
24 See SHUBBER, supra note 21, at 13.
25 See Mendelsohn, supra note 20, at 509-10.
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ample, that an American businessman poisons his British wife
while both are aboard an Air India flight direct from Rome to
Copenhagen. Exactly where the poison was administered is not
known. It could have been over Italy, the Adriatic, Austria,
Czechoslovakia, Germany, Denmark or the Baltic Sea."'26 Under
those facts and the varying bases of jurisdiction recognized in
international law prior to the Tokyo Convention, it is entirely
possible that the United Kingdom, Czechoslovakia, Italy, Aus-
tria, Germany, Denmark, the United States, or even India could
claim jurisdiction under existing principles of jurisdiction in in-
ternational law.2 7 Under the jurisdictional basis of territorial-
ity-that each state may exert sovereign control over all acts
occurring within or above its territory-each country over which
the plane flew could claim jurisdiction, provided that it could be
proven exactly where the poisoning occurred.21 India could as-
sert jurisdiction under territoriality "by treating an Indian flag
aircraft, like a vessel, as a juridical extension of Indian terri-
tory. ' 29 Additionally, on the basis of nationality-that each state
is assumed to have legal control over its nationals-the United
States could assert jurisdiction." Similarly, under the "passive
personality doctrine," which states that jurisdiction can be as-
serted based upon the nationality of the victim, Britain could
assert jurisdiction.
Even more troubling, however, is the possibility that no coun-
try could assert jurisdiction, which is conceivable if in fact the
poisoning in the above hypothetical had taken place over the
Adriatic or Baltic Seas.3 2 A complete lack of jurisdiction is in-
deed what happened in the famous case of United States v. Cor-
dova. 3 In Cordova, shortly after take-off from San Juan, Puerto
Rico, in August of 1948, Cordova, having consumed too much
rum prior to take-off, assaulted the pilot, a stewardess, and an-
other passenger while the flight, operated by an American cor-
porate airline, was over the Atlantic Ocean.34 Upon arrival at La
Guardia Field, Cordova and another passenger were immedi-
26 Id. Note that at the time of the illustration, Czechoslovakia was still one
country. See id.
27 Id. at 510.
28 See id. at 511.
29 Id. at 512.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 510.
33 89 F. Supp. 298 (E.D.N.Y. 1950).
34 Id. at 300.
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ately arrested.15 However, the plane assaults had all taken place
over high seas; therefore, Cordova was not convicted, despite
the judge finding him guilty of committing the offenses, be-
cause there was no federal jurisdiction to punish those acts.3 6
Against problems such as this, combined with the new climate in
air travel, "the scale and rate of growth of air transport made the
need for a convention much greater than [ever] before,"37 and
the international community decided to take the necessary legis-
lative action.
B. THE DRAFTING OF THE CONVENTION: FROM JURISDICTION
TO SAFETY
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) was
created by the Chicago Convention to "meet[ ] the needs of the
peoples of the world for safe air transport."'38 The subject first
arose at the Sixth Session of the Legal Committee of ICAO at
Montreal in 1950 when the Mexican Representative of the ICAO
Council proposed to the Legal Committee to consider the "legal
status of aircraft."39 Although the Legal Committee did not im-
mediately include the subject into its work program, it did refer
this topic to an ad hoc subcommittee, noting that "such a study
[was] not purely theoretical and present[ed] many problems of
considerable importance. '40  Furthermore, after receiving a
communication from the International Federation of Airline Pi-
lots' Associations (IFALPA) arguing that airline pilots should
not be held civilly liable in the course of their flying duties, the
ad hoc subcommittee determined that both the "Legal Status of
the Aircraft" and the "Legal Status of the Aircraft Commander"
should be considered. 41 At the Seventh Session of the ICAO Le-
gal Committee, the subcommittee delineated certain jurisdic-
tional needs to be addressed and admonished the organization
that "it [was] essential to define clearly ... the rights and obliga-
tions [of the aircraft commander] to be recognized uniformly
35 Id.
36 Id. at 304. This is not the only such case where this problem arose. See
Fitzgerald, supra note 20, at 230 n.1 (listing several British cases that encountered
the same jurisdictional problem).
-7 SHUBBER, supra note 21, at 14.
38 Id. at 6.
39 Boyle & Pulsifer, supra note 19, at 307.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 308.
374
GET OFF MY PLANE
by all [c]ontracting [s]tates as belonging to an aircraft com-
mander with their limitations and possible extensions.
42
Despite the apparent urgency, it was not until 1953 that the
ICAO Council placed the "Legal Status of the Aircraft" on the
work program of the Legal Committee, finally directing the Le-
gal Committee to begin active work." It created a formal sub-
committee, "whose only task [was] to study, consider and advise
on the problems [that] may arise in connection with crimes in
aircraft,"' 4 beginning the systematic study of the topic of "Legal
Status of the Aircraft. '45 The subcommittee was not simultane-
ously tasked with studying the "Legal Status of the Aircraft Com-
mander. ''46 This "remained on the work program of the Legal
Committee as a dormant item. '47 After several exploratory ses-
sions, the subcommittee limited its scope mainly to the jurisdic-
tional issues discussed in Part II(A) of this comment and elicited
the aid of several states in analyzing the issues.4" The United
States undertook a report focusing strictly on issues arising from
criminal acts.49 It focused on the competing bases for the exer-
cise of penal jurisdiction 50 and ultimately decided that only two
have unanimous acceptance in every country: the territoriality
basis (that each state has complete and absolute sovereignty
over its airspace) and the state-of-registry basis (that jurisdiction
lies in the state in which the aircraft is registered). 5'
The subcommittee took its first steps toward developing a
draft convention in 1956 at Geneva, dealing specifically with the
subject matter discussed in the U.S. report and limiting the
scope of its study to the criminal aspects of the problems relat-
ing to the legal status of aircraft.52 Thus, any issues concerning
civil matters were formally dropped from the "Legal Status of
the Aircraft. ' 53 The aim of the convention became "the recogni-
tion, by international agreement, of the competence of [s] tates
42 Id. at 308-09 (emphasis added).
43 Id. at 311.
44 SHUBBER, supra note 21, at 7.
45 Boyle & Pulsifer, supra note 19, at 311.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 311-12.
49 Id. at 312.
5o For a discussion of some of these competing bases for jurisdiction, see supra
notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
51 Boyle & Pulsifer, supra note 19, at 312.
52 SHUBBER, supra note 21, at 7.
53 Boyle & Pulsifer, supra note 19, at 316.
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to establish jurisdiction of their courts under national laws." 54
However, "the [s]ub-committee also decided to [formally] con-
sider .. the 'Legal Status of the Aircraft Commander,' insofar
as it related to crimes committed on board aircraft," thus reviv-
ing the dormant subject.55
The momentum built at Geneva ground to a halt under the
party states' inability to agree on the jurisdictional issues.56
However, under strong urging from the United States, the Legal
Committee decided to schedule another meeting of the legal
status subcommittee in 1958.5 ' To expedite action, the United
States prepared a draft convention for use by the subcommittee,
which was submitted to the ICAO in August of 1958.58 It has
been suggested that this report was the foundation for further
work on the convention, making it "the precursor to the first
ICAO draft. 59
The first draft convention of the "Legal Status of the Aircraft"
was produced at Montreal in 1958.60 Despite significant resis-
tance from some who thought a convention was unnecessary,
the subcommittee ultimately moved forward with a draft conven-
tion, citing (1) the need to clarify the jurisdictional issues and
(2) "the need to define the powers of the aircraft commander to
take necessary measures in respect of acts on board endanger-
ing the safety of flight and for the preservation of order over the
passengers on board."'" With respect to the powers and duties
of the aircraft commander, the subcommittee "was guided by
considerations relating to safety of the aircraft," specifically stat-
ing that it was important "that there should be internationally
adopted rules which would enable aircraft commanders to main-
tain order on board ... in respect to offenses or ... any acts
endangering safety of the aircraft or persons or goods on board"
and to provide immunity from liability.6 2 Thus, from the very
54 Id. at 317.
55 Id. at 316.
56 Id. at 318.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 319. But see SHUBBER, supra note 21, at 8.
60 Boyle & Pulsifer, supra note 19, at 320.
61 Id. (quoting Rep. of the ICAO Legal Status of the Aircraft Sub-Comm., Sept.
20, 1958, LC/SC Legal Status No. 63) (internal quotation marks omitted).
62 Id. at 321 (quoting Rep. of the ICAO Legal Status of the Aircraft Sub-
Comm., Sept. 20, 1958, LC/SC Legal Status No. 63) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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first draft, a dominant theme arose: "that the [c]onvention
should have, as a principal purpose, the enhancement of safety."63
Continuing the momentum gained in Montreal, the full Legal
Committee met the next year in Munich to consider the draft
convention.64 After resolving the lingering jurisdictional issues,
the committee focused the scope of the draft:
Careful attention was given to that part of the draft convention
dealing with the powers and duties of the aircraft commander.
Having in mind that the aircraft commander will not normally have
legal training, the [c] ommittee formulated his powers in relation
to acts which are "prejudicial to the safety of the aircraft or per-
sons or property therein or to good order and discipline on
board." In respect to such acts the aircraft commander may im-
pose necessary measures of restraint on the actor .... 65
Furthermore, it was decided that upon landing, the aircraft
commander may disembark and turn over to the authorities an
actor if the commander "has reason to believe a 'serious offense'
has been committed."66 Lastly, the committee decided that the
aircraft commander should enjoy full immunity from any liabil-
ity if acting pursuant to the convention.67 Having completed a
draft convention, the committee requested international organi-
zations and ICAO member states to submit comments on the
draft.6"
Over the next three years, the issue of safety aboard aircraft
finally became the primary purpose of the convention. While
the legal committee awaited the comments from member states,
there was "a rash of hijacking incidents" both in the United
States and internationally.69 The dramatic surge in cases of such
serious breaches of safety led the United States to propose an
addition to the draft convention governing hijacking.7 The Le-
63 Id. (emphasis added).
64 Id.
65 Id. at 323 (quoting Rep. of the ICAO Legal Comm., 12th Sess., Aug. 1959)
(emphasis added).
66 Id. at 323-24.
67 Id. at 324.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 325; see Fitzgerald, supra note 20, at 240-41 n.24 (listing in detail hi-
jacking incidents in then-Czechoslovakia, the Far East, Cuba, the United States,
Venezuela, Portugal, and Mexico and noting that such incidents forced the
United States to draft legislation concerning added security measures on board
aircraft); SHUBBER, supra note 21, at 344 app. II (listing over a dozen cases of
hijacking internationally between 1958 and 1961).
70 Boyle & Pulsifer, supra note 19, at 325.
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gal Committee held two sessions in 1962 and adopted the pro-
posed hijacking article; 7' additionally, "[t] he various changes...
made by the [c] ommittee... dealing with the powers and duties
of the aircraft commander were substantially incorporated. 72
Finally, on August 20, 1963, thirteen years after the project's
creation, the ICAO Council convened at Tokyo for the "further
consideration, finalization, adoption and opening for signature
of the Rome Draft. ' 73 "Sixty-one [s] tates and five international
organizations were represented at the [c]onference, ' 74 and on
September 14, 1969, the parties present signed the convention,
ushering in a new era in international air law.75 With respect to
the powers of the aircraft commander, the language of the
treaty finally settled upon is found in, Chapter III and reads, in
relevant part:
Article 6
1. The aircraft commander may, when he has reasonable
grounds to believe that a person has committed, or is about to com-
mit, on board the aircraft, an offence or act contemplated in Ar-
ticle 1, paragraph 1,76 impose upon such person reasonable
measures including restraint which are necessary:
(a) to protect the safety of the aircraft, or of persons or prop-
erty therein; or
(b) to maintain good order and discipline on board; or
(c) to enable him to deliver such person to competent author-
ities or to disembark him in accordance with the provisions of
this [c]hapter.
2. The aircraft commander may require or authorize the assis-
tance of other crew members and may request or authorize, but
not require, the assistance of passengers to restrain any person
whom he is entitled to restrain. Any crew member or passenger
may also take reasonable preventative measures without such au-
thorization when he has reasonable grounds to believe that such
action is immediately necessary to protect the safety of the air-
craft ....
71 Id. at 325, 327-28.
72 Id. at 328.
73 SHUBBER, supra note 21, at 12.
74 Id.
75 See id.
76 Article 1, paragraph 1 states: "This Convention shall apply in respect of: (a)
offences against penal law; (b) acts which, whether or not they are offences, may
or do jeopardize the safety of the aircraft or of persons or property therein or
which jeopardize good order and discipline on board." Tokyo Convention, supra
note 9, art. 1, 1.
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Article 8
1. The aircraft commander may, in so far as it is necessary for
the purpose of subparagraph (a) or (b) of paragraph 1 of Article
6, disembark in the territory of any [s] tate in which the aircraft
lands any person who he has reasonable grounds to believe has com-
mitted, or is about to commit, on board the aircraft an act con-
templated in Article 1, paragraph 1 (b).
2. The aircraft commander shall report to the authorities of
the [s]tate in which he disembarks any person pursuant to this
Article, the fact of, and the reasons for, such disembarkation.
Article 9
1. The aircraft commander may deliver to the competent au-
thorities of any [c] ontracting [s] tate in the territory of which the
aircraft lands any person who he has reasonable grounds to believe
has committed on board the aircraft an act which, in his opinion,
is a serious offence according to the penal law of the [s]tate of
registration of the aircraft ....
3. The aircraft commander shall furnish the authorities to
whom any suspected offender is delivered in accordance with the
provisions of this Article with evidence and information which,
under the law of the [s]tate of registration of the aircraft, are
lawfully in his possession.
Article 10
For actions taken in accordance with this [c]onvention,
neither the aircraft commander, any other member of the crew,
any passenger, the owner or operator of the aircraft, nor the per-
son on whose behalf the flight was performed shall be held re-
sponsible in any proceeding on account of the treatment
undergone by the person against whom the actions were taken.77
III. RECENT INTERPRETATIONS OF "REASONABLE
GROUNDS TO BELIEVE" AND "REASONABLY'
UNDER THE TOKYO CONVENTION
The finalization of the Tokyo Convention proved anticlimac-
tic: no cases were brought forward. In fact, to date, only two
international cases have contested actions taken by the aircraft
commander and his crew under the Tokyo Convention-a 2006
magistrate court decision in Israel78 and the 2010 Eid case in the
77 Id. arts. 6, 8-10 (emphasis added).
78 DC (Hi) 1716/05 A Zikry v. Air Can. [2006] (Isr.); see Moshe Leshern, Court
Analyzes the Elements of Air Carriers Immunity Under the Tokyo Convention 1963: Zikry
v. Air Canada, 32 AIR & SPACE L. 220 (2007).
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Ninth Circuit.79 The timing of these cases suggests that perhaps
the Tokyo Convention is enjoying a resurgence of interest re-
lated to changes in aviation following the terrorist attacks of 9/
11. As such, determining the appropriate level of deference to
be given the airplane captain and crew acting pursuant to their
powers under the Tokyo Convention is a question that may soon
cease to be academic and instead form the center of the
controversy.
A. THE ZiKRY DECISION
During an Air Canada flight from Tel Aviv to Toronto on Au-
gust 25, 2004, flight crew members began to suspect that the
plaintiff had smoked in the aircraft lavatories when two passen-
gers sitting adjacent to the lavatories in the middle of the air-
craft informed the crew members that one passenger was
frequenting the lavatories, and that upon his exit each time, he
smelled of cigarette smoke. 0 One of the passengers identified
the plaintiff and informed the flight crew that she had also over-
heard a conversation between two other passengers saying that
they believed the plaintiff had neutralized the smoke detectors
and was smoking in the lavatory."1 The crew asked the passen-
gers if they could describe the man in question, and their
description matched that of the already-suspected plaintiff.8 2
On further investigation, the flight attendant confirmed that the
passenger definitely smelled of smoke. 3 Furthermore, "[a]
flight attendant recovered a cigarette butt from the lavatory
waste-bin" that matched the brand of cigarettes the plaintiff ad-
mitted having in his bag. 4
The flight crew confronted the passenger, taking his passport,
and upon landing in Toronto, two policemen questioned the
plaintiff but ultimately let him go.8 5 However, an Air Canada
official, to whom the police had directed the plaintiff upon his
release, took his flight tickets and cancelled them. 6 The plain-
tiff purchased another ticket to his final destination, Montreal,
79 Eid v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 621 F.3d 858 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S.
Ct. 2874 (2011).
80 Leshem, supra note 78, at 220, 222-23.




85 Id. at 220.
86 Id.
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again on an Air Canada flight, "since [the Air Canada counter]
was the only operating counter." 7  But when the plaintiff
boarded the flight to Montreal, "Air Canada's personnel or-
dered [him] to disembark."88 Approximately one month later,
he received a letter "advis[ing] him that he was banned from
further flight on Air Canada's flights .. until he proved to Air
Canada's satisfaction" that he did not pose a further risk. 9 The
plaintiff filed suit, alleging "that the flight crew members had
humiliated him in front of the passengers," despite his contin-
ued denial of smoking or attempting to smoke on board the
aircraft, and that the measures taken by the crew members were
libelous within the meaning of the Israeli Defamation Law of
1965.90
In defense, Air Canada invoked Articles 6 and 10 of the Tokyo
Convention.9 Article 6 states that where an aircraft commander
"has reasonable grounds to believe that a person has committed,
or is about to commit, on board the aircraft," an act (poten-
tially) jeopardizing the "safety of the aircraft" or the "good order
and discipline on board," he may take "reasonable measures...
to protect the safety of," or "good order and discipline on," the
aircraft.9 2 Additionally, Article 6 provides that "[t]he aircraft
commander may require or authorize the assistance of other
crew members" to meet those goals.93 Article 10 grants aircraft
commanders immunity from any action, civil, criminal, or arbi-
tration, "[flor actions taken in accordance with th[e]
[c] onvention. ' 4
Addressing this issue of immunity for the first time in any
courtroom, the court took an approach that was highly deferen-
tial to the captain.95 The court determined that the pertinent
question was not whether an act was committed that did, in fact,
jeopardize the safety of the flight, but whether "under the cap-
tain's discretion" such an act might have been committed.9 6
Furthermore, the court emphasized that it would not judge the
actions with the benefit of hindsight, but rather as the captain
87 Id. at 220-21.
88 Id. at 221.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 221-22; see Tokyo Convention, supra note 9, arts. 6, 10.
92 Tokyo Convention, supra note 9, art. 6; see Leshem, supra note 78, at 221.
93 Tokyo Convention, supra note 9, art. 6; see Leshem, supra note 78, at 221.
94 Tokyo Convention, supra note 9, art. 10.
95 See Leshem, supra note 78, at 222-24.
9r, Id. at 222.
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would have understood them in the moment: "one should not
examine whether it has been proved that the plaintiff actually
smoked during the flight" but rather whether there was "an act
. . . committed, which under the captain's discretion constituted
offense, even if post factum it was a false apprehension." 7
Thus, in determining whether the airline should enjoy the im-
munity provided by the convention and whether the captain
had "reasonable grounds to believe that an act had been com-
mitted [that] jeopardized the safety of the flight," the court
granted a great deal of deference to the captain and crew. 8
The court clearly demonstrated this by emphasizing that the air-
line did not have to prove that the plaintiff actually had smoked
on the flight but rather only that it had reasonable grounds to
believe that he may have done so.99 "Thus, the court [made]
the important distinction between what actually happened and
what was reasonably believed by the crew members to have hap-
pened" and "further stressed that the facts should not be examined
in hindsight, but at the time of the actual event. ' ' ° Thus, the air
carrier did not have to prove that the plaintiff actually did
smoke, but only that "at the time the occurrence took place, the crew
had reasonable grounds to believe that safety was
jeopardized."'10 1
Applying the above to the facts, the court found that when the
possibility of someone smoking arose on the flight, "it was strong
enough to justify the steps taken by Air Canada's personnel" and
that the crew members' chief consideration was maintaining
good order and safety on board. 0 2 The court further found
that the steps taken by the crew were reasonable and therefore
not libelous.0 3 It also concluded that banning the plaintiff
from Air Canada flights until he proved to no longer be a safety
risk was reasonable as well. 0 4
While the court did not define "reasonable grounds to be-
lieve," it clearly granted the aircraft commander and his crew
substantial deference. The court examined the facts only as




100 Id. at 222-23 (emphasis added).
101 Id. (emphasis added).
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the time and found that the further preventative measures of
cancelling the plaintiffs new tickets to Montreal and banning
him indefinitely from Air Canada were also reasonable, as they
were made in the name of aircraft safety.
B. THE EID DECISION
The Ninth Circuit faced a similar scenario to that of the Zikry
court but took the opposite approach, applying an objective
American negligence standard of reasonableness in interpreting
the treaty.105 The Ninth Circuit was ruling on a summary judg-
ment motion by the district court dismissing the case under the
Tokyo Convention;10 6 it did not rule on whether the captain ac-
ted reasonably but rather on whether there existed a question of
fact that should be sent to the jury."0 7 This procedural posture
is important because it led the court to incorrectly look at the
facts as the plaintiffs alleged them, under the premise that in
summary judgment the facts must be looked at most favorably to
the non-moving party."0 8
On September 29, 2003, a group of Egyptian businessmen
and their significant others boarded an Alaska Airlines flight
from Vancouver to Las Vegas, where they were to meet with a
potential business partner at a convention on energy-related
products.' °9 The plaintiffs were flying in the first-class cabin,
where they occupied all but three of the seats." 0 According to
the one other passenger in the first-class cabin, tension ap-
peared to be running high between the Egyptian passengers and
the flight crew from the beginning of the flight."1 ' About an
hour after take-off, one of the plaintiffs sitting in the first row
stood up to stretch but was asked by a flight attendant to take a
seat or move toward the rear of the first-class cabin to stretch, as
standing is not permitted directly outside the cockpit.1 2 He
moved to the back, but another flight attendant ordered him to
sit down, using "an unpleasant loud voice.""' 3 The plaintiffs al-
105 See Eid v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 621 F.3d 858, 867-68 (9th Cir. 2010), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 2874 (2011).
106 Id. at 865.
107 Id. at 875.
108 Id. at 862. That the facts should be viewed as the plaintiffs allege them will
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leged that the same flight attendant "continued to hector him,"
gave him a "Customer Inflight Disturbance Report" to fill out,
and "yelled at [the plaintiff's] son to 'zip it up, end of discus-
sion.'""14 When the plaintiff told the flight attendant that she
was actually supposed to fill out the form, the flight attendant
"went ballistic" and became increasingly "irrational," "yelling at
the top of her lungs.""' 5 Then, over another objection from the
plaintiffs, the flight attendant allegedly proclaimed, "[T]hat's it
I'm taking this plane down." '16 She proceeded to the phone
and told the captain that she had "lost control of the first-class
cabin," at which point the captain and first officer, without ask-
ing further questions and without looking through the cockpit
window, "diverted the plane to Reno, where local police and
TSA officials were waiting at the gate.""'
"The Reno-Tahoe Airport police then came onto the aircraft,
and the passengers were disembarked.""' 8 The captain insisted
that the plaintiffs be arrested, but "TSA quickly cleared [the]
plaintiffs to continue flying.""' 9 The captain declined a request
to allow them to reboard his flight, and after the plaintiffs
boarded an American West flight, Alaska Airlines contacted
America West, asking that they deny the plaintiffs passage. 2 °' As
a result of the delay, the plaintiffs missed the scheduled meeting
with the potential business partner, never consummated the
deal, and were even questioned by the FBI (in response to
Alaska Airlines issuing a report to the Joint Terrorism Task
Force). 21 They brought suit for damages.1 22
The district court examined the facts alleged and, holding
that the standard of review of the airline captain's decision was
"arbitrary and capricious" under the Tokyo Convention, granted
Alaska Airlines' motion for summary judgment. It is important
to note at this juncture that some of these facts alleged by the
plaintiff were in dispute, but it was undisputed that, at the time
of the incident, the captain only knew that there was a distur-
114 Id. at 863.
115 Id.





121 Id. at 865.
122 Id.
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bance and that the flight attendant had "lost control of the first-
class cabin. 123
The Ninth Circuit overturned the district court, beginning its
analysis with the plain language of the treaty, 124 and asserting
that because the text is clear, "[the court had] no power to in-
sert amendment." 125 Reasoning that the plain language of the
Tokyo Convention conditions immunity for the pilot and crew
on the phrase "reasonable grounds," the court found that rea-
sonableness was the appropriate level. 26 The court also consid-
ered the "negotiation and drafting history of the treaty, 127
proclaiming that the drafting history is "consistent with the
treaty's plain language," and concluding that "the drafting his-
tory say[s] nothing about 'arbitrary and capricious.'" ' 12' The
court particularly relied on statements made by the American
delegate to support its conclusion that a reasonableness stan-
dard was intended:
At least in the United States legal system ... the phrase "reasona-
ble grounds" had a substantial legal significance .... Within the
general concept of United States law, the phrase "reasonable
grounds" would give the impression that the aircraft commander
would be required to have a substantial basis for his belief, that
he could not act on the basis of facts which were inadequate to
support his belief to the effect that a person had committed or
was about to commit the kind of act under consideration. 12
9
As its next step in interpreting the Tokyo Convention, the
court examined the postratification understanding of other na-
tions,"' in this case, the Zikry decision. 1 ' However, the Zikry
decision was not examined in detail. The court merely noted
that "[i]n Zikry, the court held that the key questions were
'whether reasonable grounds [existed to 9upport] the suspicion
that the [p]laintiff had committed an offense on board the air-
123 See id. at 864-65.
124 Id. at 866 (citing Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 518-19 (2008)).
125 Id. (quoting Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122, 134 (1989)) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted).
126 Id. at 866-67.
127 Id. at 866 (quoting Medellin, 522 U.S. at 507) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
128 Id. This statement is patently false, as shown infra note 198 and accompany-
ing text.
129 Id. at 867 (quoting Minutes to Tokyo Convention, supra note 18, at 155).
130 Id. (citing Medellin, 553 U.S. at 507).
131 Id.
2012] 385
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
craft, as well as the question of reasonableness of the steps taken
against him.' 12
Finally, the court proclaimed that its "interpretation [was]
consistent with [its] cases applying the analogous statute for do-
mestic air law, 49 U.S.C. § 44902(b),"'33 relying on two cases in-
terpreting that statute,"3 4 both of which held that domestic
"airlines don't have immunity when they bar passengers from
boarding on the basis of 'unreasonably or irrationally formed'
beliefs."' 3 5 As its final justification for adopting a reasonable-
ness standard, the court noted that this "is a well-established and
easily-understood standard, one that American courts are accus-
tomed to applying in a wide variety of situations involving the
behavior of individuals. '13
6
Applying its reasonableness standard to the plaintiffs' facts,
the court found that a "fact finder... could conclude that [the
captain] did not have reasonable grounds to believe that [the]
plaintiffs posed a threat to the security or order of the aircraft"
because he neither asked questions of the flight attendant nor
looked to see the situation through the cockpit window, and
therefore, a jury could determine that there was no emergency
situation present.'3 7 Furthermore, a jury could also conclude
that the captain did not act reasonably once the plane was on
the ground because he could have investigated the flight attend-
ant's adverse report further before asking the police to arrest
the plaintiffs.' 3 8
The Eid decision, despite its misleading statements to the con-
trary, took a markedly different position from the Zikry court on
how much deference the captain of a plane in international
flight should be afforded when trying to ensure the safety of the
aircraft.
132 Id. (quoting DC (Hi) 1716/05 A Zikry v. Air Can. [2006] (Isr.)). Curiously,
this is all the court mentioned of Zikry; it never attempted to actually show how
that court interpreted "reasonable grounds" or "reasonableness." See id.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 867-68 (citing Newman v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 176 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir.
1999); Cordero v. Cia Mexicana de Aviacion, 681 F.2d 669 (9th Cir. 1982)).
135 Id. at 868 (quoting Cordero, 681 F.2d at 671) (citing Newman, 176 F.3d at
1131).
136 Id.
137 Id. at 869-70, 872.
138 Id. at 872.
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IV. A PROPER INTERPRETATION OF THE TOKYO
CONVENTION MUST AFFORD THE CAPTAIN
AND CREW THE HIGHEST LEVEL
OF DEFERENCE
The question of the appropriate level of deference to be af-
forded to the airline captain is ultimately a treaty interpretation
question, which under international law must begin with refer-
ence to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna
Convention).' 39 Progressing to the United States, while the Su-
preme Court has increasingly taken treaty interpretation cases
onto its docket as society becomes more globalized, "it is surpris-
ing how undertheorized the field of treaty interpretation re-
mains."' 40 Indeed, "treaty interpretation contains a myriad of
unresolved and controversial issues."'' A proper understand-
ing of the interpretation of the Tokyo Convention should look
not only to the jurisprudence on treaty interpretation alone but
also to contract interpretation theory, as the goal of contract in-
terpretation is to give meaning to the intention of the parties.
142
A. TREATY INTERPRETATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
THE VIENNA CONVENTION
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention states, "A treaty shall be
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary mean-
ing to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in
the light of its object and purpose."'143 While this seems to imply
139 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 31-32, May 23, 1969,
115 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]; see also Carlos Manuel Vas-
quez, Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause and the Judicial Enforcement of
Treaties, 122 HARV. L. REV. 599, 677 n.347 (2008) ("Although the United States is
not a party to the Vienna Convention, the treaty is widely understood to have
achieved the status of customary international law in the years since it was
opened for signature in 1969.").
140 Curtis J. Mahoney, Treaties as Contracts: Textualism, Contract Theory, and the
Interpretation of Treaties, 116 YALE L.J. 824, 824 (2007).
14' Malgosia Fitzmaurice, Book Review, 104 AM. J. INT'L L. 329, 329 (2010)
(reviewing RICHARD GARDINER, TREATY INTERPRETATION (2008) and ULF
LINDERFALK, ON THE INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES: THE MODERN INTERNATIONAL
LAw As EXPRESSED IN THE 1969 VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES
(2008)).
142 See Alabama v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 2295, 2317 (2010) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (" [T] reaties are to be interpreted upon the principles which govern
the interpretation of contracts. . . with a view to making effective the purposes of
the high contracting parties." (alteration in original) (quoting Sullivan v. Kidd,
254 U.S. 433, 439 (1921))); Mahoney, supra note 140, at 826.
143 Vienna Convention, supra note 139, art. 31, 1.
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an almost purely textual interpretation, Article 32 provides that
"[r]ecourse may be had to supplementary means of interpreta-
tion, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the cir-
cumstances of its conclusion," to confirm the text or when the
text "leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure" or "is mani-
festly absurd or unreasonable."' 44
It is important to note that Article 32's acceptance of supple-
mentary means of interpretation is, on its face, limited to cir-
cumstances where the text is in doubt or is ambiguous. 4 5 This
has prompted a great deal of scholarship internationally, prima-
rily regarding the appropriateness of using supplementary
means to determine the intention of the parties.'46 While the
debate remains open, there is strong support for interpreting
treaties with the primary goal of identifying the intention of the
parties and using supplementary materials to achieve that pur-
pose: "The intention of the parties-express or implied-is the
law. Any considerations-of effectiveness or otherwise-which
tend to transform the ascertainable intention of the parties into
a factor of secondary importance are inimical to the true pur-
pose of interpretation." '147 This position echoes the United
States courts' approach to contract interpretation, 4 8 which is of
critical importance in domestic treaty interpretation.
B. TREATY INTERPRETATION IN THE UNITED STATES
Treaty interpretation in the United States has transformed in-
terestingly in the past twenty years, moving from a dynamic ap-
proach (based on principles of contract theory) to a textualist
approach (which focuses instead on the commonly understood
144 Id. art. 32.
145 See id.
146 See Fitzmaurice, supra note 141, at 330 ("Apart from differences in the gen-
eral approach taken to treaty interpretation, certain fundamental issues remain
the subject of disagreement-perhaps none more so than the role of the inten-
tion of the parties, including as expressed in the travaux prdparatoires.").
147 Id. at 331 (quoting Hersch Lauterpacht, Restrictive Interpretation and the Prin-
ciple of Effectiveness in the Interpretation of Treaties, 1949 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 73); see id.
at 330 (recognizing that the European Court of Human Rights takes this more
"dynamic" approach to treaty interpretation).
148 See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1774
(2010) (recognizing that "as with any other contract, the parties' intentions con-
trol" (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 626 (1985))); United States v. Winstar Corp. 518 U.S. 839, 911 (1996)
("Under ordinary principles of contract law, one would construe the contract in
terms of the parties' intent.").
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definitions of the words in a treaty rather than the intent of the
parties), and back to the contract-based dynamic approach. 49
Whether applying a textualist or dynamic approach, the
United States Supreme Court has clearly held that "[tlhe inter-
pretation of a treaty, like the interpretation of a statute, begins
with its text"'50 as well as "the context in which the written words
are used."' 5 ' However, the Court has made clear that the text is
merely a starting point: "[T]o ascertain [a treaty's] meaning, we
may look beyond the written words to the history of the treaty,
the negotiations, and the practical construction adopted by the
parties.' 1 52 Furthermore, a treaty's interpretation should be
"consistent with the negotiating history of the [c]onvention, the
conduct of the parties to the [c]onvention, and the weight of
precedent in foreign and American courts."'15 1 With respect to
specific words, "definition [s] should be flexibly applied after as-
sessment of all the circumstances surrounding."'
' 54
149 See Mahoney, supra note 140, at 829-32. Mahoney traces the Supreme
Court's decisions through three treaty interpretation cases. In United States v.
Stuart, 489 U.S. 353 (1989), a case involving a bilateral tax treaty between the
United States and Canada, the Court drew from a number of supplementary
materials, including negotiating materials and past practices of the signatories,
while noting that a treaty should be "construe[d] .. . liberally to give effect to the
purpose which animates it." Id. at 359-70 (alteration in original) (quoting Ba-
cardi Corp. of Am. v. Domenech, 311 U.S. 150, 163 (1990)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). In Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122 (1989), the Court,
facing an interpretation question under the Warsaw Convention, changed to a
textualist approach, as Justice Scalia wrote that the Court "must... be governed
by the text." Id. at 134. However, in Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644
(2004), the Court returned to a contracts-based approach, declaring it is a court's
"responsibility to read [a] treaty in a manner 'consistent with the shared expecta-
tions of the contracting parties."' Id. at 650 (quoting Air Fr. v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392,
399 (1985)).
150 Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 506 (2008) (citing Saks, 470 U.S. at
396-97).
151 Saks, 470 U.S. at 396-97. It is important to note that the majority in the Eid
decision curiously left off the part of the quote mentioning "the context in which
the . . .words are used." See Eid v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 621 F.3d 858, 866 (9th
Cir. 2010). As will be explained infra, the context clearly points to a broader
interpretation.
152 Saks, 470 U.S. at 396 (quoting Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United States,
318 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1943)).
153 Id. at 400; see Medellin, 552 U.S. at 507 ("[W]e have also considered as 'aids
to interpretation' the negotiation and drafting history of the treaty as well as 'the
postratification understanding' of signatory nations." (citing Zicherman v. Ko-
rean Air Lines, Co., 516 U.S. 217, 226 (1996))).
154 Saks, 470 U.S. at 405.
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These "aids to interpretation" that the Court applies clearly
indicate that treaties are to be interpreted like contracts. More-
over, the Court has held that "it is [the Court's] responsibility to
give the specific words of the treaty a meaning consistent with
the shared expectations of the contracting parties. '155 In fact, it
seems that an even more dynamic interpretive approach should
be taken in treaty interpretation than in that of normal con-
tracts, as the Court has stated that "[t]reaties are construed
more liberally than private agreements.' 1 56 Driving the final
nail into the textualist's coffin, the Court has recognized that
the plain meaning of a treaty's language will be overridden by
contradictory intent: "The clear import of treaty language con-
trols unless 'application of the words of the treaty according to
their obvious meaning effects a result inconsistent with the in-
tent or expectations of its signatories.' "'5 Lastly, beyond evi-
dence of the general intent of the signatories, the United States'
own interpretation (and hence related intent) of a treaty "is en-
titled to great weight."'' 58
The operation of this dynamic approach is clearly illustrated
in Zicherman, where even Justice Scalia-the champion of mod-
ern textualism159-recognized that treaty interpretation must go
beyond the text of the treaty itself.' 61 In Zicherman, the plaintiffs
sought loss-of-society damages for the death of their relative,
whose Korean Air Lines plane had been "shot down over the Sea
of Japan" as it traveled from Anchorage, Alaska, to Seoul, South
155 Id. at 399; see Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 185
(1982) ("Our role is limited to giving effect to the intent of the [t] reaty parties.").
156 See Saks, 470 U.S. at 396 (quoting Choctaw Nation of Indians, 318 U.S. at
431-32) (internal quotation marks omitted).
157 Avagliano, 457 U.S. at 180 (quoting Maximov v. United States, 373 U.S. 49,
54 (1963)).
158 Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983, 1993 (2010) (quoting Avagliano, 457 U.S.
at 185 ("deferring to the Executive's interpretation of a treaty as memorialized in
a brief before the Court")) (adopting the position taken by the brief for the
United States); see Medellin, 552 U.S. at 508, 513 (adopting the United States'
position as expressed in the amicus brief submitted to the Court on the interpre-
tation of a treaty provision).
159 Justice Scalia is widely regarded as the champion of modern textualism. See
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, The Unknown Jdeal?, 96 MICH. L. REv. 1509,
1511 (1998) ("Scalia's main point is that a statutory text's apparent plain mean-
ing must be the alpha and the omega in a judge's interpretation of a statute.");
see, e.g., Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I
thought we had adopted a regular method for interpreting the meaning of lan-
guage in a statute: first, find the ordinary meaning of the language in its textual
context .... [W]e apply that ordinary meaning.").
160 See Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217, 224-32 (1996).
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Korea. 6 ' The case required the interpretation of the Warsaw
Convention governing international air transportation,' 62 in
particular Article 17, which provides:
The carrier is liable for damage sustained in the event of the death
or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by
a passenger, if the accident which caused the damage so sus-
tained took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of
the operations of embarking or disembarking. 163
Thus, the question before the Court was whether the loss of soci-
ety of a relative is a "damage sustained" that is recoverable
under Article 17.164 Recognizing that the English word "dam-
age," the translation of the word "dommage" from the original
French text of the treaty, encompasses "an extremely wide range
of phenomena," the Court remarked that "[i]t cannot seriously
be maintained that Article 17 uses the term in this broadest
sense" and ultimately rejected the application of the term's
"plain meaning."' 65
In interpreting the term's meaning, the Court began by stat-
ing that it must determine "the shared expectations of the con-
tracting parties"' 6 6 and proclaiming:
Those involved in the negotiation and adoption of the
[c]onvention could not have been ignorant of the fact that the
law on this point varies widely from jurisdiction to jurisdic-
tion .... [W]e find it unlikely that they would have understood
Article 17's use of the general term "dommage' to require com-
pensation for elements of harm recognized in France but unrec-
ognized elsewhere, or to forbid compensation for elements of
harm unrecognized in France but recognized elsewhere. 167
Thus, to determine the "shared expectations," the Court broke
from the text, instead using the "negotiating and drafting his-
tory (travaux preparatoires) and the postratification understand-
ing of the contracting parties. 168 The Court concluded, based
on a pair of statements in the drafting history, that the question
1,i Id. at 219.
162 Id. at 218; see Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to
International Carriage by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876 [hereinaf-
ter Warsaw Convention].
163 Warsaw Convention, supra note 162, art. 17 (emphasis added).
164 Zicherman, 516 U.S. at 221.
165 Id. at 221-22.
166 Id. at 223 (quoting Air Fr. v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 399 (1985)) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted).
167 Id.
168 Id. at 226.
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of who may recover what damages was to be determined by do-
mestic law.1 69 The Court further identified relevant statutes
passed by other party states (postratification conduct) that bol-
stered this conclusion. 7 ' Having thus used the extra-textual
sources of interpretation to identify the intention of the con-
tracting parties to the treaty, the Court concluded that domestic
law in the United States did not permit damages for loss of
society. 7 '
In summarizing treaty interpretation theory both internation-
ally and domestically, we can conclude that under both, treaty
interpretation must begin with the text of the treaty itself.172
However, both recognize that the interpretation of the con-
tracting parties controls and that it may be necessary to go be-
yond the text to determine that intention. In the United States
specifically, the Supreme Court has recognized a list of aids to
treaty interpretation: (1) the context in which the words were
written;1 73 (2) the treaty's history; 74 (3) the drafting and negoti-
ation history of the treaty; 7 5 (4) the weight of precedent in both
foreign and domestic courts; 176 and (5) the executive branch's
interpretation, as reflected in amicus briefs submitted before a
court.
1 7 7
C. BOTH THE TEXT AND THE CONTEXT VEST THE AIRPLANE
CAPTAIN WITH WIDE DISCRETION, SUGGESTING A
HIGHLY DEFERENTIAL STANDARD
Articles 5-10 of the Tokyo Convention vest a broad range of
powers in the aircraft commander (or captain) and crew. 178
The captain may impose "reasonable measures including re-
straint" on any person who threatens "the safety of the aircraft,
or of persons or property therein" or the "good order and disci-
169 Id. at 226-27.
170 Id. at 227-28.
171 Id at 231.
172 Compare Vienna Convention, supra note 139, art. 31, 1 ("A treaty shall be
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to
the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and pur-
pose."), with Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 506 (2008) ("The interpretation of
a treaty, like the interpretation of a statute, begins with its text.").
173 Air Fr. v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 396-97 (1985).
174 Id. at 396.
175 Medellin, 552 U.S. at 507.
176 Saks, 470 U.S. at 400.
177 Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983, 1986 (2010).
178 Tokyo Convention, supra note 9, arts. 5-10.
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pline on board. ' 179 The captain may also "require or authorize
the assistance of other crew members" and may even authorize
the passengers to restrain potentially dangerous passengers.8 °
Furthermore, crew members or passengers themselves may
"take reasonable preventative measures," even without authori-
zation from the captain, when they have "reasonable grounds to
believe that such action is immediately necessary to protect the
safety of the aircraft, or of persons or property therein."''
Once the plane is on the ground, the convention permits the
captain to "disembark" any passenger whom he has "reasonable
grounds to believe has committed, or is about to commit" any
act that threatens "the safety of the aircraft" or passengers, or
the "good order and discipline on board," and in that event he
is required to "report to the authorities ... the fact of, and rea-
sons for, such disembarkation.' 1 2 Lastly, the captain may de-
liver to "competent authorities" in the country where an aircraft
lands any person whom he has "reasonable grounds to believe
has committed on board the aircraft an act which, in [the cap-
tain's] opinion, is a serious offence."'8 3
In an effort to encourage the exercise of this broad range of
powers, the convention immunizes the captain, crew, passen-
gers, and air carrier against any legal liability based on treatment
of the passenger in question, provided the actions taken are in
accordance with the convention.' 84
Article 1 of the convention explains that the captain's author-
ity covers acts that not only in fact jeopardize safety but also
those that might jeopardize the safety or discipline on the air-
craft, "whether or not they are offences."' 85 The captain does not
have to wait until a passenger acts; he may respond with "reason-
able measures" once he has "reasonable grounds" to believe that
a passenger is about to do something to jeopardize safety.' 8 6
Thus, from the broad scope of authority provided to the captain
throughout the entire convention and the immunity it provides
to him, it is clear that "the treaty signatories intended the cap-
179 Id. art. 6(1).
180 Id. art. 6(2).
181 Id.
182 Jd. arts. 8(1)-(2), 6(1).
183 Id. art. 9(1) (emphasis added).
184 Id. art. 10; see Fitzgerald, supra note 20, at 247.
185 Tokyo Convention, supra note 9, art. 1(1)(b) (emphasis added).
186 Id. art. 6(1).
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tain's exercise of that authority to be reviewed with great defer-
ence, whatever the precise articulation of that standard." '187
This assertion is further affirmed when one considers that the
convention provides that once a pilot has turned over a passen-
ger to the competent authorities, these authorities-trained in
investigative techniques-are responsible for any investigation
needed. 8 As such, a passenger whom hindsight reveals not to
have committed a crime will not be subject to penalty. Thus, the
convention, when viewed in its entirety, delicately balances the
interest in maintaining security on board aircraft with the pri-
vate interests of the individuals.
Surveying the entire context in which the terms "reasonable
grounds to believe" and "reasonable measures" are used con-
firms this broad authority conferred upon the captain.1 89 Ignor-
ing this was a critical mistake made by the Ninth Circuit in Eid.
The court took a flawed and myopic textualist approach to the
treaty, focusing almost exclusively on the terms "reasonable
grounds" and "reasonable measures."' 0 It relied exclusively on
the use of the word "reasonable" as indicative that the "text is
clear" that reasonableness is the standard of review because, it
asserted, reasonableness is "easily-understood.""1 1 Concluding
that "reasonable" is well-established and easily-understood, par-
ticularly in light of an international agreement, falls nothing
short of judicial hubris of the highest caliber. In fact, "[f] rom a
methodological point of view, it appears that an analysis of the
notion of 'reasonable' cannot be achieved through a mere tech-
nical or dogmatic approach," but "[r]ather, this analysis re-
quires that the notion be examined from a variety of critical
angles. '111 2 The majority of international scholarship "em-
phasise[s] the notion's essentially subjective character, which
renders, if not impossible, at least extremely difficult any at-
187 Brief for the United States of America as Amicus Curiae at 13, Eid v. Alaska
Airlines, Inc., 621 F.3d 858 (9th Cir. 2010) (No. 06-16457).
188 Id. at 19.
119 See Eid, 621 F.3d at 866-68.
190 See id. at 866-67.
91 Id. at 866, 868.
192 Oliver Corten, The Notion of "Reasonable" in International Law: Legal Discourse,
Reason and Contradictions, 48 INT'L & COmP. L.Q. 613, 613 (1999). In this article,
the author analyzed the term "reasonable" as used in an international context
from several hundred decisions and opinions by various international courts. See
id. at 613-25.
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tempt to provide a definition.11 9 3 This variety-of-angles analyti-
cal approach to words of difficult international definition seems
to be exactly what the Court did in Zicherman, analyzing the term
"damages" from a variety of different viewpoints, and it is indeed
what we must do in discerning the proper level of deference
under the Tokyo Convention.'94
Lastly, even if there were a clear definition of the term "rea-
sonable" or "reasonableness" in the international context, such
a definition would not control if "application of the words of the
treaty according to their obvious meaning effects a result incon-
sistent with the intent or expectations of its signatories."' 9 5 A
restrictive understanding of "reasonable" is indeed inconsistent
with the expectations of the signatories, as the history of the To-
kyo Convention, its drafting, other courts' decisions, and the ex-
ecutive branch's interpretation of it all clearly show.
D. THE HISTORY OF THE TOKYO CONVENTION DEMONSTRATES
THAT THE INTENT OF THE PARTIES WAS TO CONFER
BROAD DISCRETION
As was discussed in Part II, the Tokyo Convention was drafted
at a time when a growing number of incidents threatened air-
line security, causing the "principal purpose" of the convention
to shift from jurisdictional issues arising from international air
travel to "the enhancement of safety" on board the aircraft.'96
The extensive history behind the development of the conven-
tion, in particular Articles 5-10 on the "Powers of the Aircraft
Commander," demonstrates that the central goal of the broad
immunity conferred by the Tokyo Convention was "to en-
courage captains to take decisive action, often under chaotic cir-
cumstances, to preserve the safety of the plane and its
passengers without fear of [second-guessing]."97 A highly def-
erential standard of review is necessary to give effect to this goal.
193 Id. at 614; see also Eid, 621 F.3d at 882 (Otero, J., dissenting) ("[T]he word
reasonable' does not necessarily carry the same meaning across all legal
systems.").
194 See supra notes 164-71 and accompanying text.
195 Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 180 (1982) (quoting
Maximov v. United States, 373 U.S. 49, 54 (1963)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
196 See supra notes 19-77 and accompanying text.
197 Brief for the United States of America as Amicus Curiae, supra note 187, at
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E. THE DRAFTING AND NEGOTIATING HISTORY DEMONSTRATES
CLEAR INTENT FOR A HIGHLY DEFERENTIAL STANDARD
OF REVIEW
The drafting and negotiating history, contrary to the mislead-
ing assertions made by the court in Eid, shows that a highly def-
erential standard was meant to apply. Even the statements of
the U.S. delegate to the convention quoted by the Ninth Circuit
in support of a reasonableness standard actually contemplated
an arbitrary and capricious standard, specifically at the end of
the passage, with the remark that "[i] n other words, the aircraft
commander could not act arbitrarily or capriciously."' 98
Furthermore, a brief exploration of the understanding of the
term "reasonable grounds" in the United States at the time the
convention was adopted in 1969 reveals it to imply a highly def-
erential standard. As the U.S. representative stated, "'the
phrase "reasonable grounds" had a substantial legal signifi-
cance' in U.S. law." 199 At that time, the phrase "reasonable
grounds to believe" was used in certain federal statutes, includ-
ing one authorizing Bureau of Narcotics agents "to make war-
rantless arrests where there were 'reasonable grounds to believe'
a violation of federal narcotics laws had occurred or was occur-
ring.1'20 Additionally, "the Supreme Court [had] held that in-
formation from a reliable informant could provide 'reasonable
grounds' under the statute. 21 The Supreme Court had also
held that "reasonable grounds" under federal arrest statutes in-
quire only as to whether "the facts and circumstances known to
the officer warrant a prudent man in believing that the offense
has been committed. '2 2 Applying these standards by analogy to
an airline captain, "reasonable grounds" exist when a captain
relies on the facts known to him, as provided by members of his
crew (reliable informants). This is a far more deferential stan-
198 Minutes to Tokyo Convention, supra note 18, at 155; see Eid, 621 F.3d at 867.
Of critical importance is that the court in Eid omitted the last sentence advocat-
ing the arbitrary and capricious standard, which not only shows that the court's
interpretation is entirely inconsistent with the intention of the drafting parties,
but it is also intentionally misleading and incorrect. See Eid, 621 F.3d at 867.
199 Brief for the United States of America as Amicus Curiae, supra note 187, at
16.
200 See id. at 17 (citing Narcotics Control Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-728, § 104,
70 Stat. 567, 570).
20I Id. (citing Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 313 (1959)).
202 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102
(1959)).
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dard of review than the reasonable-person inquiry applied in
Eid.
Moving beyond the assertions and understanding of the
United States, the minutes to the Tokyo Convention are replete
with statements indicating a highly deferential standard of re-
view. The Greek representative noted that the purpose of the
language of Article 5 was to ensure that "the aircraft com-
mander would not exercise his powers in an arbitrary way."20 3
The British representative explained his understanding to be
"that the aircraft commander was not protected if he exceeded
his powers, if he acted maliciously.'' 2°4 The Italian representative
was in favor of immunity if the pilot did not "[commit] arbitrary
acts. ' 2°5 The German representative understood that a pilot had
acted "without reasonable grounds, if he intentionally abused his
powers or if he was guilty of serious negligence.' 2 6 And the par-
ties to the convention rejected an Argentine proposal that
would have required the aircraft commander to have an objec-
tive basis of "concrete" and "specific external facts" when re-
straining or disembarking a passenger who had not yet
committed an act, as it would conflict with the convention's goal
"to give powers of judgment to the aircraft commander. ' 2 7
Furthermore, the minutes indicate the drafters' concern that
the prospect of liability would paralyze the flight crews from "ex-
ercis[ing] the full authority given to them by the [c]onvention,"
as demonstrated by their consistent rejection of proposals to
"water down" or remove the immunity provided by the conven-
tion.2 " For example, the drafters rejected an immunity provi-
sion that required the captain to adhere "strictly" to the treaty
terms, since a restrictive interpretation would reduce the protec-
tion the convention sought.20 9 Likewise, a proposal to eliminate
the immunity provision altogether was quickly rejected, as "the
aircraft commander might have to hesitate and might, perhaps,
do nothing in circumstances in which he should have acted. 210
203 Minutes to Tokyo Convention, supra note 18, at 174 (emphasis added).
204 Id. at 221-22 (emphasis added).
205 Id. at 226 (emphasis added).
206 Id. at 227 (emphasis added).
207 Id. at 178-79.
208 See Brief for the United States of America as Amicus Curiae, supra note 187,
at 9, 14.
209 Minutes to Tokyo Convention, supra note 18, at 223-24.
210 Id. at 219, 223.
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Thus, the minutes to the convention clearly demonstrate that
the drafting parties not only intended a highly deferential stan-
dard for reviewing acts taken by captains and crews pursuant to
the convention, but also feared the consequences of not afford-
ing such deference with respect to the immunity provision.
F. THE MAJORITY OF FOREIGN COURTS AND DOMESTIC COURTS,
BY ANALOGOUS FEDERAL STATUTE, CONFIRM A HIGHLY
DEFERENTIAL STANDARD
As discussed in Part III of this article, the only other court to
have specifically addressed the standard of review for an airline
captain's acts under the Tokyo Convention is the Israeli court in
Zikiy. 21' While not explicitly defining "reasonable grounds," the
Zikiy court showed a great deal of deference to the actions taken
by the captain and his crew, explicitly stating that in determin-
ing whether the captain's actions were "reasonable," the captain
did not have to prove that an actual crime was committed but
merely that he had "reasonable grounds" to believe that one
might have been.21 2 Furthermore, the facts of the case were to
be examined only as the captain knew them at the time of the
event-not with the benefit of hindsight.21- The court therefore
not only found that the captain's decision to disembark the al-
leged offender was reasonable, but so was the airline's decision
to ban him from all further flights.2
1 4
Bringing the subject closer to home, American courts inter-
preting the analogous domestic statute, 49 U.S.C. § 44902,215
have given great deference to airline captains, applying an arbi-
trary and capricious standard of review. Section 44902(b) states:
"[A] n air carrier, intrastate air carrier, or foreign air carrier may
refuse to transport a passenger or property the air carrier de-
cides is, or might be, inimical to safety."2 6 The Second Circuit
set out the test for reasonableness under Section 44902 in Wil-
liams v. Trans World Airlines-
211 See supra notes 78-104 and accompanying text.
212 See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
213 See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
214 See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
215 Both the majority and dissent in Eid recognized this to be analogous to the
Tokyo Convention and correctly stated that this statute is relevant to the proper
interpretation of the Tokyo Convention. See Eid v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 621 F.3d
858, 883 (9th Cir. 2010).
216 49 U.S.C. § 44902(b) (2006).
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The test of whether or not the airline properly exercised its
power under [Section 44902] ... rests upon the facts and cir-
cumstances of the case as known to the airline at the time it formed its
opinion and made its decision and whether or not the opinion
and decision were rational and reasonable and not capricious and
arbitrary in the light of those facts and circumstances. They are
not to be tested by other facts later disclosed by hindsight.'17
The other circuits have since either adopted the same test or
applied the same arbitrary and capricious standard. In Cerqueira
v. American Airlines, the First Circuit "agree [d] with Williams and
h[e]ld that an air carrier's decisions to refuse transport under
[Section] 44902(b) are not subject to liability unless the deci-
sion is arbitrary or capricious."21 The Ninth Circuit expressly
agreed with the Williams test in Cordero v. CIA Mexicana de Avia-
cion, adopting the arbitrary and capricious standard, 2 " and has
recently reaffirmed this position in Shaffy v. United Airlines,
Inc.220 And in Smith v. Comair, Inc., the Fourth Circuit took a
similar approach, holding that "[p]ursuant to 49 U.S.C.
§ 44902 (b), airlines must be accorded broad discretion in making
boarding decisions related to safety. 221
Under both foreign case law and analogous domestic case law,
it is clear that the airline captain must be afforded great defer-
ence when reviewing his actions under the Tokyo Convention.
G. THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH'S INTERPRETATION ADvoCATES A
HIGH DEGREE OF DEFERENCE
The Ninth Circuit in Eid asked the Department of Justice to
submit a brief as amicus curiae explaining the U.S. position on
the appropriate level of deference to be applied under the To-
kyo Convention.222 However, the majority made no mention of
this brief in its analysis of the Tokyo Convention, despite abun-
dant Supreme Court precedent holding that the interpretation
of the United States is entitled to great weight.223 In its thirty-
page brief, the United States repeatedly advocated for a highly
deferential standard, citing the text of the convention, the his-
217 509 F.2d 942, 948 (2d Cir. 1975) (emphasis added).
218 520 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2008).
219 681 F.2d 669, 671-72, 672 n.4 (9th Cir. 1982).
220 360 F. App'x 729, 730 (9th Cir. 2009).
221 134 F.3d 254, 259 (4th Cir. 1998) (emphasis added).
222 See Brief for the United States of America as Amicus Curiae, supra note 187,
at 1.
223 See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
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tory surrounding its adoption, and the drafting history of the
text.224 The position taken by the United States was that "[t] he
Tokyo Convention vests pilots and other flight crew with expan-
sive discretion to take action in response to potential threats to
safety, order, and discipline affecting the plane or its passen-
gers," that "[a] court applying the Tokyo Convention should not
simply ask whether the captain's actions were correct with the
benefit of hindsight, but must consider whether the information
known to the captain at the time supports the exercise of broad
discretion afforded to him," and "that the treaty signatories in-
tended the captain's exercise of [his] authority to be reviewed
with great deference."225
H. As A PRACTICAL MATTER, THE CULTURE OF FLIGHT TODAY
AND CURRENT UNITED STATES LAW NECESSITATE A
HIGHLY DEFERENTIAL STANDARD
In their amici curiae brief to the Supreme Court, the Interna-
tional Air Transport Association (IATA), who participated in the
drafting of the Tokyo Convention, and the Air Transport Associ-
ation of America (ATA), who urged its ratification in the United
States, advocated a highly deferential standard of review under
the convention.226 Alluding to the increasing number and grav-
ity of incidents involving disruptive passengers, the enhanced se-
curity concerns in the wake of 9/11, and the special
environment and risks associated with airline flight, they advo-
cated a highly deferential standard because it "is essential to safe
and orderly civil aviation. ' 227 Both the IATA and the ATA recog-
nized that captains have a unique responsibility, that the culture
of flight is different in the wake of 9/11, both from a standpoint
of heightened social awareness of danger as well as increased
airline regulations, and that the airplane in flight is a unique
environment with unique risks.
To begin, it is long-standing law and a well-understood notion
today that the captain of an aircraft, "or pilot in command, is
directly responsible for, and is the final authority as to the oper-
224 See Brief for the United States of America as Amicus Curiae, supra note 187.
225 Id. at 8, 13, 20 (emphasis added).
226 See Brief of Amici Curiae Air Transport Ass'n of America, Inc. & Interna-
tional Air Transport Ass'n in Support of Petitioner, Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Eid,
131 S. Ct. 2874 (2011) (No. 10-962), 2011 WL 720850, at *4 [hereinafter ATA/
IATA Brief].
227 Id. (quoting ICAO Assembly Resolution A33-4 (33d Sess., Montreal, Sept.
25-Oct. 5, 2001)).
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ation of the aircraft and the safety of the passengers and
crew."228 Since 9/11, the weight of this responsibility has grown
heavier, with the threat of terrorism even greater than at the
time of the Tokyo Convention. 229 Furthermore, the new secur-
ity regulations since 9/11 have bestowed upon the captain
greater responsibility for security concerns.30
These new security measures, as well as added regulations and
training for both captains and crews, make it impracticable, if
not impossible, to act if they are to be held to anything but a
greatly deferential standard. For example, since 9/11, FAA reg-
ulations require that all passenger aircraft have reinforced lock-
able cockpit doors, which must remain closed at all times when
the aircraft are in operation.2 31 Additionally, the pilots must re-
main in their seats with seat belts fastened.232 Because of these
regulations, a captain must "rely [on] the reports of his cabin
crew." 233 Furthermore, not only is his reliance on the cabin
crew practically necessary, but it is "fundamentally sound," since
the entire cabin crew is trained and certified pursuant to FAA
regulations, receiving the flight security training required by the
TSA. 234 That such reliance is fundamentally sound is bolstered
by additional training and instruction that pilots and crews now
receive in the post 9/11 world. Pilots are forbidden from leav-
ing the flight deck to help crew members with security
problems, and crew members are instructed to "[e]nsure that
the flight deck door is secure at the first sign of a threat," never
to be opened "under any circumstances, including bodily harm
228 Appellee's Brief at 10, Eid v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 621 F.3d 858 (9th Cir.
2010) (No. 06-16457), 2007 WL 968289 (quoting 14 C.F.R. § 91.3(a) (2006)
("[T]he pilot in command of an aircraft is directly responsible for, and is the
final authority as to, the operation of that aircraft."); 14 C.F.R. § 121.537 (2006)
("Each pilot in command of an aircraft is, during flight time, in command of the
aircraft and crew and is responsible for the safety of the passengers,
crewmembers, cargo, and aircraft .... ")).
229 ATA/IATA Brief, supra note 226, at *7 ("[T] he threat is always evolving and
terrorist tactics are becoming more sophisticated.").
230 Brief of Amici Curiae Air Line Pilots Ass'n, International & International
Federation of Air Line Pilots Ass'n in Support of Petitioner, Alaska Airlines, Inc.
v. Eid, 131 S. Ct. 2874 (2011) (No. 10-962), 2011 WL 688738, at *4 [hereinafter
Pilots' Brief].
231 14 C.F.R. §§ 25.795, 121.587 (2011).
232 14 C.F.R. § 121.543 (2011).
233 Pilots' Brief, supra note 230, at 6.
234 Id. (citing 14 C.F.R. §§ 121.415, 121.417 (2010); 49 C.F.R. § 1544.233
(2010)).
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to passengers or other [crew members]. ''235 They are also
warned that any lower-level threats can, and often do, escalate
into higher-level threats and that lower-level threats could be
used as distractions by hijackers to infiltrate the flight deck.236
Lastly, they are advised that "[e]arly communication and inter-
vention can help prevent threat escalation." '237
To impose upon pilots a more restrictive standard of review,
such as the reasonableness standard taken by the Ninth Circuit
in Eid, ignores the reality of contemporary flight security mea-
sures. Such a standard would require a captain to conduct an
independent investigation before acting,238 something that cap-
tains have neither the time nor the resources to do when travel-
ing at incredible speeds and altitudes in a completely closed
environment.239 In contrast, a deferential standard takes into
account the time-sensitive nature of flight, the increasing regula-
tions and training imposed upon captains and their crews, and
the heavy responsibility carried by captains.
V. CONCLUSION
The Tokyo Convention was a thirteen-year process created at
a time when aircraft security was of the utmost importance, and
yet the threat that existed back then seems far less than what we
face today in a post-9/11 world. Not only is a highly deferential
standard of review necessary in light of this bleak reality, it is
also consistent with the text and context of the convention, the
clear intention of the drafting parties, the international and do-
mestic case law, and the United States' own interpretation of
the treaty it ratified. A pilot seeking to secure safety on board an
international flight must be confident that his judgment will be
afforded the greatest level of deference should he find it neces-
sary to tell a passenger: "Get off my plane." This, even more
than the grizzliest Harrison Ford impersonation, will lend the
necessary weight to his words.
235 FAA, TH-E COMMON STRATEGY FOR HIJACK 21 (2002), reprinted in Brief for the
United States of America as Amicus Curiae, supra note 187, app.
236 Id.
237 Id. (emphasis added).
238 Pilots' Brief, supra note 230, at 7-8.
239 Id.
402
